Liberalization Attempts and Consequences by Anne O. Krueger
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Liberalization Attempts and Consequences





Chapter Title: Macroeconomic Policies in Phase Ill Episodes
Chapter Author: Anne O. Krueger
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c3856
Chapter pages in book: (p. 119 - 142)Chapter 7
of course, but that
Macroeconomic Policies
in Phase Ill Episodes
Thefact that exchange control and QRs significantly affect the impact of
devaluation and its consequences does not imply that the more conventional
macroeconomic aspects are less important than in instances of devaluation
under a liberalized regime. All models of exchange rate adjustment are based
on the notion that it is the real exchange rate, not the nominal rate, that affects
economic behavior. It therefore follows that, if devaluation leads to a new set
of fixed nominal and effective exchange rates, domestic inflation at a rate in
excess of the world rate will sooner or later result in a return to the former real
situation.'If a Phase III package is to have a significant probability of leading
• to reduced bias and sustained liberalization, the macroeconomic policies that
accompany devaluation are of great importance.
• There are a number of a priori reasons to expect the impact of devalua-
tion on the domestic price level and on the level of economic activity to be dif-
ferent when it occurs under exchange control from what it would be when the
primary purpose is to eliminate a previous trade and payments deficit. In the
first place it is only the net devaluation that should affect any aspects of ag-
gregate demand; except for possible effects on expectations, there is no reason
why the replacement component of the devaluation should affect economic
behavior. Second, insofarasthe devaluation serves to absorb license
premiums, there should be no effect on the domestic price level; the absorption
of purchasing power should be deflationary. Third, if imports are increased
following devaluation—as often happens when foreign lenders play a role in
the devaluation decision—the increased import flow is itself deflationary and
might even result in a decline in the domestic price of importables. Fourth,
some automatic shifts in the government budget may result. If tariffs are ad
valorem, for example, tariff revenues will increase as long as the foreign value
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of imports does not decline proportionately more than the increase in the im- demand which
port EER. The government budget may also benefit if, following devaluation, India's 1966
export subsidies are removed and export duties are imposed as is sometimes payments regir
the practice for traditional exports. Finally, there is the possibility that im- monetary and
proved resource allocation and removal of the deadweight costs of the trade Few deval'
and payments regime may increase real income, shift monetary
The monetary and fiscal policies as well as the import policies that accom- episode. South
pany devaluation have an important impact on the level of aggregate demand Turkey's in 197
relative to aggregate supply; thus they are crucial to the ultimate outcome of ly at altering
the devaluation itself. This chapter reviews the types of monetary and fiscal Altogether
policies that accompanied the Phase Ill episodes treated in the country studies; ing been aimed
it also examines the behavior of imports in the immediate postdevaluation the trade and p
period. In Chapter 8 the short-run responses of economic activity, price taken place at a
behavior, and the balance of payments are evaluated, alternative to
Underlying all this are the basic questions about the nature of the optimal arose Or there
devaluation package: Which monetary and fiscal policy will enable the regime was cor
reallocation of resources and permit sustained liberalization without incurring eliminate QRs s
unnecessary costs in the form of domestic recession? Is it advisable to increase Tying toge
imports in the immediate postdevaluation period? What sort of devaluation liberalizing the
package is most likely to induce a sustained change in export performance and that failure to
the trade and payments regime? This, and the next several chapters, provide achieve the sec
evidence about these questions, but the questions themselves will not be direct- Preventing the t
ly considered until Chapter 10. liberalization ef:
use of instrumei
successful
I. OBJECTIVES OF MACRO POLICIES world rate.
While both
Trade Regime Changes and Domestic Goals the relative
from episode to
All three Brazilian devaluations, Chile's three, Columbia's five, Ghana's policy package
1966/67 episode, South Korea's 1964 devaluation, the Philippines' 1970 payments
episode, and the Turkish devaluation of 1958 were characterized by their package. In
governments as"stabilization programs." As the name implies, a stabilization to international
program is aimed partially, or largely, toward controlling aggregate demand duce pledges to
and reducing the domestic rate of inflation. Altering the trade and payments A clear-cut
regime is only one aspect of the package and is not necessarily the primary ob- the domestic ant
jective.2
In addition to those formally designated stabilization programs, two In all three case
other devaluations were accompanied by restrictive shifts in monetary and itself. Instead it
fiscal policy that were aimed at controlling domestic inflation. One was
primary motive
Foreign repaym
Israel s 1952-1955 New Economic Policy, which shifted from quantitative con- and donor- and
trols (over both domestic and international transactions) to reliance upon pric- portant than in


































OBJECTIVES OF MACRO POLICIES
demand which had been contained by quantitative measures in earlier years.
India's 1966 devaluation was principally directed toward the trade and
payments regime, but it was accompanied by a shift toward more restrictive
monetary and fiscal policy.
Few devaluations were devoid of some significant, conscious attempt to
shift monetary and fiscal policy. The main exceptions were Israel's 1962
episode. South Korea's 1961 devaluation, the Philippines' in 1960, and
Turkey's in 1970. All of these can be regarded as having been aimed exclusive-
ly at altering the trade and payments regime.3
Altogether there were seventeen devaluations that can be regarded as hav-
ing been aimed at changing both domestic aggregate demand determinants and
the trade and payments regime. Such a link is logical: if rapid inflation has
taken place at a fixed exchange rate, QRs must have been imposed (as the only
alternative to exchange rate adjustments) unless fortuitous circumstances
arose or there was initially a large trade and payments surplus. If the QR
regime was compelled by domestic inflation, it makes sense to attempt to
eliminate QRs simultaneously with the effort to control inflation.
Tying together the objectives of stabilizing the domestic price level and
liberalizing the trade and payments regime under a fixed exchange rate implies
that failure to attain the first objective will necessarily result in failure to
achieve the second.4 It will be argued in Chapter 10 that a major factor in
preventing the transition to Phase IV regimes has been the dependence of the
liberalization effort on the outcome of the anti-inflationary program and that
use of instruments such as a crawling peg or floating exchange rate can permit
successful liberalization even in cases where inflation rates do not dip to the
world rate.
While both objectives were important in each of the seventeen episodes,
the relative weights attached to each differed from country to country and
from episode to episode. In some instances the major motive for the entire
policy package was the desire to control domestic inflation; alteration of the
payments regime and the exchange rate were undertaken simply as part of the
package. In other cases a critical foreign-exchange situation prompted resort
to international lending agencies, and they had the leverage necessary to in-
duce pledges to change monetary and fiscal behavior.
A clear-cut example of exchange rate realignment undertaken as part of
the domestic anti-inflationary package is provided by Behrman:
In all three cases liberalization of the foreign sector was not the dominant goal in
itself. Instead it was but one component of an overall stabilization program. The
primary motives were to reduce inflation and to increase capacity utilization..
Foreignrepayment obligations, speculation against the currency, capital flight,
and donor- and creditor-country pressures have all been significant, but less im-
portant than internal concerns. Foreign-sector policy generally has been much
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more an appendage ofdomestic policy, albeit an important appendage, rather
than vice versa.'
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Bhagwati and Srinivasan made no men-
tion of domestic factors as motivating the Indian devaluation:
The major motivating factors underlying the decision to devalue were two-fold:
(1) the adjustment of the parity in a situation of overvaluation seemed to fit in
rather well with the government's earlier, slow attempts aimed rather at reducing
the ill-effects of the overvaluation of the parity by offsetting measures such as ex-
port subsidization; and (2) more important, the AID-India Consortium had vir-
tually made a major devaluation a precondition for the resumption of aid, leaving
the government little maneuverability because of the acute shortage of foreign ex-
change.6
In general, need for foreign exchange seems to have resulted in reluctant
acquiescence to changes in domestic policy more often than domestic objec-
tives have led to alteration of the trade and payments regime. In Ghana,
despite debt rescheduling and substantial increases in aid, projected shortfalls
of foreign exchange were the dominant motive for exchange rate changes;
restrictive domestic policy (which in any event was not carried out for very
long) was undertaken simply to buttress the devaluation.7 In Colombia, the
1957, 1962, and 1965 devaluations were all undertaken only reluctantly and in
direct response to problems in the foreign-exchange market; domestic con-
siderations had little to do with the decisions. Likewise, in 1958 the Turks ac-
cepted monetary and fiscal restraint only after long delays and because it
became apparent that foreign credits would not be available without such
restrictions.' The Philippines' 1970 devaluation was also motivated by their
foreign exchange position; foreign debt obligations were the major factor
leading to exchange rate alterations, and monetary and fiscal changes were
made in pursuit of that goal.'
Unfortunately, for purposes of research, records of the commitments
made by credit-receiving countries are generally not made public. The Interna-
tional Monetary Fund's famous "consultation papers" are widely discussed in
press reports, but no copies are available for research purposes. It is apparent
that the IMF has sometimes negotiated ceilings on the amount of bank credit,
money supply, and other variables thought to be responsible for domestic in-
flation and excess demand pressures. Certainly devaluing countries must have
made such arrangements in a number of the stabilization programs studied in
the NBER project where foreign credits were forthcoming at the time of
devaluation. However, despite frequent references to belt-tightening, stringent
monetary and fiscal policy, and other aspects of domestic stabilization, only in
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endage, rather central bank credits and the money supply (as well as government expen-
ditures) openly reported.'°
a made no men-
Role of Foreigners
Stabilization programs differ from each other, not only in the emphasis placed
on foreign, relative to domestic, objectives, but also in the extent to which
foreign pressures contributed to the decision to adopt the program. With the
exception of the Israeli 1952 devaluation, the IMF or some other foreign
government or agency was involved in the formulation of the policy package.
Foreigners have played a role in a variety of ways. In some cases foreign par-
ticipation was behind the scenes and entailed little more than meeting com-
mitments that had been made earlier to provide supporting credits if devalua-
tion were undertaken. That happened in Turkey in 1970; the TL had been
visibly overvalued for several years, and the consortium of international
lenders had repeatedly discussed altering the exchange rate. There was little or
no negotiating activity involved in the devaluation decision itself, although
some foreign credits were immediately forthcoming. For Ghana, foreign in-
volvement was also relatively inconspicuous. As explained by Leith:
In late 1966 the NLC government obtained substantial rescheduling of the debts
falling duethrough1968 ... andin early 1967 the IMF convened a meeting of
Ghana's ten major western donor countries, with the result of increased aid of-
fers. Yet neither of these forms of relief could be regarded as anything more than
a short-term palliative. If external assistance were to continue for long, Ghana
would have to put its balance of payments in order. ... OnJuly 8, 1967, the then
Commissioner of Finance and NLC member, Brigadier A.A. Afrifa, announced
the devaluation. ... Insumming up, he put forward devaluation as a necessary
and logical decision taken in Ghana's own interest. No foreign pressure was either
officially acknowledged or blamed, although in a post-devaluation press release,
E.N. Omaboe, Commissioner of Economic Affairs, is quoted as saying that
"donor countries are no doubt going to be impressed by the boldness with which
we have approached these economic problems."
Other devaluations, like those of Chile in 1956 and India in 1966, were
very different. In the Chilean case a Washington consulting firm—Klein-
Saks—was hired to prepare a stabilization program for the government, and
its recommendations were largely implemented. As Behrman reported:
It should be pointed out .. thatthe identification of the 1956-58 attempt in par-
ticular with foreign interests discredited this program in the eyes of many
Chileans. In part the identification was with official agencies, especially the IMF.
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In Chile's other liberalization attempts, foreign pressures also played a con-
siderable role. I
Foreignintervention became a political issue in many other instances. In-
deed, controversy over "IMF policies" marked a great many liberalization
episodes and may have done much to obscure important underlying issues.
Usually the leverage foreigners had was the urgent need on the part of the
country to finance basic import requirements. The best-documented case of
foreign pressures, and their political implications, is provided by Diaz. Things
came to such a pass between the Colombian government and donor agencies in
late 1966 that the President wentnational television to announce that he
would notyieldto such pressures.'4
In a sense the presence of foreign agencies makes it very difficult to
evaluate the causes of "failure" of some of the stabilization programs. Some
governments, such as Egypt, were never committed to stabilization in the first
place and simply agreed to the conditions laid down for receipt of foreign
credits. It is difficult to diagnose the stabilization program as "unsuccessful"
if the stated objectives of the programs did not coincide with the true objec-
tives of the governments concerned. The difficult issues raised by the par-
ticipation of foreign donors in devaluation decisions will be discussed further
in Chapter 10.
II. BEHAVIOR OF MONETARY VARIABLES
Experience with attempts to reduce the rate of growth of the money supply has
varied widely. In some cases restraint was short-lived because the government
was politically unable or unwilling to continue its policies. In some of those
cases and in others, the monetary authority did not offset the impact of net in-
creases in foreign exchange receipts resulting from the devaluation on central
bank credit. In other instances monetary restraint continued for a considerable
period of time. Some devaluation packages were accompanied by significant
reforms of the monetary system.
Cases where restraint was either short-lived or nonexistent include the
first two Brazilian Phase Ills, Chile's three episodes, Egypt's devaluation,
Israel's 1962 devaluation, South Korea's 1961 devaluation, and Turkey's 1970
effort. The 1961 Brazilian experience is representative of some of the problems
involved with attempting to restrain the money supply after a prolonged
period of inflation. As recounted by Fishlow,
A classic devaluation cum stabilization increasingly became inevitable to check the
divergent tendency of the model. It caine with Instruction 204 in March, 1961,
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abolished the auction of exchange. ... Animmediate devaluation of 40 percent
was imposed.
Domestically, a formal plan to reduce federal government expenditures
was prepared and decreed in June. Monetary restraint, despite larger fiscal
deficits than the previous year, had successfully limited expansion to 12 per cent
in the first half of the year ... butthe key to continuing monetary policy was
control over governmental expenditures and borrowing.
For the first time in the post-war period, Brazil had thus responded to persis-
tent disequilibrium by orthodox policies. It had undertaken genuine liberaliza-
tion.There was a gratifying immediate improvement in the balance of
payments. .
Inflation,however, did not abate. The large devaluation inevitably provoked
increased domestic prices: for the first half of the year wholesale prices rose 15.5
per cent compared to 9 per cent in a comparable period the year before. Monetary
restraint remained in effect despite mounting complaints concerning lack of
availability of credit. Yet it was still not so severe that output growth had been
curbed. There was still no stabilization crisis, and the corrective, or once-for-all,
relative price increases required to restore balance had been accomplished.
The experiment thus hung in the balance through August. Quadros'
dramatic resignation on August 25 signaled its effective end. The aftermath of a
presidential succession crisis is not a propitious environment in which to pursue
monetary restraint.... Inthe last quarter of 1961, there was a massive govern-
mental deficit and an increase in the money supply of 21 per cent that signaled the
end of the policy of restraint.
The Brazilian experience—as well as many others, both successful and un-
successful—illustrates the basic proposition that enforcing monetary restraint
is extremely difficult, especially after a prolonged period of inflation. When
the government is not very secure, such restraint is still more difficult and, if it
is nonetheless carried out, can even lead to the downfall of the government. In
addition to the political difficulties likely to be encountered in maintaining a
restrictive monetary policy, the success of the devaluation itself can result in
payments surpluses that have expansionary effects. In some countries the cen-
tral bank did not offset the impact of those surpluses on the money supply.
If a country with a convertible currency devalues and thereby shifts its
payments balance from deficit to surplus, it is highly likely that the money sup-
ply of the country will be significantly increased. The central bank will be pur-
chasing more foreign exchange than it is selling, and the consequent increase in
its credits will affect the money supply unless offsetting sterilizing action is
taken. Recent empirical work on a number of countries, including Germany,
Australia, and Canada, has demonstrated that reserve changes are a very im-
portant determinant of the money supply." The notion, which used to be
widely accepted, that the money supply could be regarded as a control variable126 MACROECONOMIC POLICIES IN PHASE III
easily determined by policy decisions has been substantially modified in light
of recent evidence.
For countries whose devaluation is aimed at reducing bias and liberalizing
the trade and payments regime, the impact of successful devaluation on the
country's excess of receipts over payments is considerably smaller than when
the major purpose of devaluation is the elimination of an open deficit.
Nonetheless, in a few instances covered by the NBER project, increases in
reserves following devaluation have resulted in important inflationary in-
creases in the money supply. Perhaps the most notable case was the Turkish
devaluation of 1970. Turkish reserves rose from a low of $218 million at the
end of June 1970 to $443 million in June 1971 and then to $955 million in June
1972. The large change was attributable in major part to the responses of
Turkish workers abroad (and others holding European currencies before
devaluation), who substantially increased their remittances. The central bank
was required to exchange TL deposits for European currencies but did not
have the tools to take explicit neutralizing action. It was impossible to check
the growth of the money supply sufficiently, and inflationary pressures
resulted.
Israel has also had problems in controlling the money supply after
devaluation. As Michaely explained:
The accompanying of devaluation by restrictive monetary policies has gradually
become a more difficult task due to the increasing role of foreign assets and their
automatic monetary impact. The devaluation of 1952-54 was aided by the fact
that foreign-exchange reserves were nil and automatic forces were absent. At the
time of the devaluations of 1962 and of 1971, foreign assets were substantial and
rising. The devaluation, by increasing the local-currency value of both the stock
and the current accumulation of such assets, thus had a strong automatic expan-
sionary impact on money and liquidity in the economy. ...Inthe Israeli ex-
perience ... thegovernment has normally been unable to conduct ...-
neutralizingpolicy.
Behrmanreports much the same phenomenon in Chile. Generalizing the
results of his econometric estimates, he concluded:
Changes in foreign-exchange reserves due to variations in the balance-of-
payments surplus have had substantial effects on the monetary base. The Central
Bank usually has not been able to neutralize more than a limited part of these
changes because of the limited effectiveness of its policy instruments. As a result,
both devaluation and increased quantitative restrictions have caused additional
indirect inflationary pressure through their impact on foreign-exchange reserves
and on the monetary base.1'
Of course, this increase in the money supply would not occur if devalua-
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the balance of payments. In a sense, therefore, the response of the money sup-
ply to increases in foreign reserves is one of the dampening factors that makes
long-run improvements in the balance of payments more difficult to sustain
once initial improvements have been achieved.'9 It is not one of the factors
that can prevent any short-run improvement in the balance of payments.
Both the Israeli and the Turkish experience strongly suggest that the rela-
tionship between the devaluation, payments improvement, reserye increases,
and the money supply is more likely to produce inflation the greater are the
foreign currency assets held by the country's nationals prior to devaluation.20
For countries with severe exchange control and balance-of-payments dif-
ficulties, the money supply may be no more difficult to control after devalua-
tion than before and may even be easier if the devaluation package includes
reduction in the government budget deficit. As liberalization progresses,
however, it can become increasingly difficult to contain expansionist forces,
and the problem is thus deserving of careful attention in countries whose
devaluation is likely to induce significant repatriation of funds, short-term
capital inflows, or other shifts resulting in sizable payments surpluses.
There are many cases of notable and sustained monetary restraint follow-
ing devaluation. Two that illustrate the range of experience are the Columbian
1957 episode and the Turkish experience of Colombia's 1957
Stabilization Program was undertaken in the context of "growing payments
arrears, capital flight, tightening import restrictions, increasing use of bank
credit tofinance public deficits, as well as generally expansive credit policy,
growing inflationary pressures, a rising black-market peso rate, stagnant real
output, and, last but not least, a falling dollar coffee price."22 Difficulties in
controlling the money supply led the authorities to impose guarantee deposit
requirements on imports and to rely on them as a means of controlling the
money supply as well as import demand. 23 The Columbian authorities succeed-
• ed in slowing the growth of the money supply to 11 percent in the year follow-
ing devaluation, compared with 21 percent in the year prior to devaluation.24
The Turkish situation was even more extreme. Turkey's money supply
had been increasing rapidly during the three years preceding the 1958 devalua-
tion. For the next three years the average annual rate of increase fell to less
than 10 percent. In the Turkish case, central bank credits had been used to
finance the deficits of the State Economic Enterprises, whose sales had been
• subject to price controls (in an effort to stem inflation). Removal of these con-
trols and a sharp reduction in the deficits of the State Economic Enterprises
greatly slowed the rates of increase in central bank credits and the money sup-
ply, which at the time of devaluation had become subject to ceilings set in con-
sultation with the IMF.
Finally, there are the cases where shifts in monetary policy were accom-
panied by significant reforms of the financial sector. The South Korean case is
perhaps the most notable.23 The South Korean devaluation of 1964 was ac-128 MACROECONOMIC POLICIES IN PHASE III
companied by the imposition of ceilings on the growth of the money supply,
and interest rate reforms followed shortly. There were
ceilings on the annual and quarterly increases in the four major sources of "high-
powered money," namely, central bank finance of government deficits, bank
reserves, fertilizer loans, and foreign sector deposits.... InSeptember 1965, the
government announced an interest rate reform that substantially raised interest




There is no ideal way to contrast and measure the behavior of the money
supply in the periods before and after each of the twenty-two Phase III
episodes because: (1) there is more than one aggregate measure of the money
supply, and different measures are relevant for different purposes and dif-
ferent countries; (2) use of annual data obscures a great deal, but quarterly
data are subject to the influence of seasonal fluctuations;2' and (3) financial
behavior may be significantly influenced by factors other than the money sup-
ply, such as changes in guarantee deposit requirements. Nonetheless, if these
caveats are borne in mind, it is worth examining the reported money supply in
the quarters and years surrounding the twenty-two devaluations.
Table 7-I indicates the percentage change in the money supply for one,
two, four, and eight quarters before and after devaluation. The Roman
numerals after the year indicate the quarter in which devaluation occurred.
Comparisons are then made of the percent increase in the money supply for
periods prior to devaluation with like numbers for the following period. For
example, the Brazilian money supply rose 23.5 percent from the third quarter
of 1964 to the fourth, and 7.6 percent from the fourth quarter of that year to
the first quarter of 1965.
Some of the cases cited above show up clearly: the restrictionist Israeli
policies following the start of Phase III in 1952 and the failure to adopt them
in 1962; the Chilean inability to restrict growth of the money supply; Ghana's
restrictive policy prior to devaluation; and Turkey's successful reduction in the
growth of the supply in 1958 and her inability to neutralize workers'
remittances and other inflows following the 1970 devaluation. Others are less
clear-cut and illustrate the difficulty of attempting to infer too much from in-
spection of the numbers without some knowledge of the background. Cases in
point include the behavior of the Brazilian money supply in 1961, where rever-
sal of policy in the middle of the third quarter is hidden in quarterly data; and
Colombia's 1957 episode, where the data do not take into account the shift
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Note: Data are not seasonally adjusted. The Roman numeral after the year indicates the quar.
ter in which devaluation took place and does not necessarily coincide with the start of Phase
Ill, as, for example, in Ghana, where restrictionist policy preceded devaluation. The percent
change is computed on the basis of the prior quarter; thus, for x quarters before devaluation,
the money supply in the quarter of devaluation was divided by the money supply x quarters
before.
Source: IMF,International Financial Statistics,variousissues, Line 34.
Inspection of the data in Table 7-1 suggests that, despite frequent
references to belt-tightening, stringent monetary policy, and stabilization pro-
grams, increases in the rate of expansion of the money supply following
devaluation have exceeded reductions. A number of countries experienced in-
creased rates of inflation following devaluation, and an inability to check the
growth of the money supply was an important factor in some of these in-
stances.
money supply, Table 7-1.PercentChangein Money Supply over Specified Periods before and
after Devaluation, Ten Countries
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III. FISCAL POLICY
Just as the money supply following devaluation can be influenced both by the
consequent payments surplus and by policy changes, the net shift in fiscal
policy is the result of automatic changes produced by the devaluation itself and
of deliberate policy changes introduced as part of the Phase III reform. The
good intentions that accompanied devaluation did not always result in sustain-
ed shifts in fiscal policy; in many cases governments were unable to initiate, or
to maintain, restrictive measures. The resulting budgetary deficits were fre-
quently a major factor in the government's inability to control the money
supply.
Impact of Devaluation on the Government Budget
The money supply increases automatically in response to devaluation only if
the devaluation results in a payments surplus. This impetus is likely to be of
greater importance the more liberal the predevaluation regime, but even then it
is usually of minor significance and takes some time to be realized. In contrast,
money supply increases in many developing countries result directly from
government deficits. Increases in government revenues and decreases in expen-
ditures very often automatically result from devaluation, and a budget shift
usually occurs immediately following devaluation.
As indicated repeatedly, among the characteristics of Phase II exchange
control regimes are the proliferation of detailed, partial, ad hoc regulations
and incentives and the emergence of premiums on import licenses. Phase III
episodes generally entail the removal of such partial price measures, which is
the difference between net and gross devaluation, and the partial or total ab-
sorption of the premium on import licenses. Imports themselves may increase
or decrease, depending on the nature of the devaluation package (see Table
7-3).
Most of these phenomena have automatic fiscal effects, which result from
changes in export subsidies and taxes and from altered revenue from imports.
Removal of export subsidies reduces the drain on the government budget.
Government revenues are decreased to the' extent that surcharges on imports
are removed at the time of devaluation, but tariff revenue received per unit of
imports increases to the extent that customs duties are levied ad valorem.
Whether overall tariff revenue increases or decreases depends on what happens
to the quantity of imports, the extent to which import surcharges are removed,
and whether tariffs are specific or ad valorem.
The combined influence of these factors has varied considerably among
the countries covered by the project. In Turkey the 1958 devaluation was ac-
companied by a massive increase in the flow of imports, and taxes were impos-
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ed on a number of traditional exports. The result was a sizable increase in
government revenues: taxes from foreign trade rose from TL 873 million in
1958 to TL 1,565 million in 1959. That increment alone was equal to 1.6 per-
cent of Turkish national income in 1959, and it had a significant deflationary
impact.28
Behrman found that the real value of tax revenues in Chile was affected
by three factors: (1) an increase in exports and production giving rise to in-
creased tax revenues; (2) curtailment of imports so that tariff revenue tended
to fall; and (3) inflationary expectations aroused by devaluation, which led to
reduced real government revenue and more rapid increases in prices than
would otherwise have been the case. Behrman concluded that the net effect on
real government revenues was positive.29 The South Korean experience ap-
pears to have differed. Tariff revenues fell after devaluation because the
decline in import volume exceeded the increase in the import EERs.3°
On the government expenditure side the picture is somewhat more
uniform, but the automatic effects are likely to be smaller. The removal of ex-
port subsidies tends to reduce government expenditures, but only in South
Korea were export subsidies large enough for their removal to be significant.
While export incentive schemes were abolished in other instances, they had ap-
plied to a sufficiently small class of commodities so as not to have had a
significant overall impact.3'
The other category of government expenditures affected by devaluation is
the local currency cost of government foreign currency debt. When the price of
foreign currency is increased, the amount of local currency the government
must raise in order to meet interest and repayment obligations in foreign cur-
rency increases. Unlike additional government expenditures, however, that in-
crease is not inflationary on balance, in that the funds so raised are turned over
to the central bank in payment for foreign exchange.
In general a net reduction in the government deficit is more likely to result
automatically from devaluation: (1) the greater is the increase (or the smaller
the decrease) in the flow of imports following devaluation; (2) the more export
subsidies are eliminated following devaluation; and (3) the more export taxes
(usually imposed on traditional exports) are imposed as part of the devaluation
package. Of the cases covered by this project, however, only the Turkish
devaluation of 1958 produced changes that significantly and automatically in-
creased government revenues. In most other countries the automatic revenue
and expenditure effects were relatively weak.
L
Restrictive Policy during Phase III Episodes
Among the seventeen Phase III episodes that were accompanied by efforts to
restrict monetary and fiscal policy, there were varying degrees, of success in132 MACROECONOMIC POLICIES IN PHASE III
altering the fiscal impact of the government budget. Turkey in 1958, Ghana in
1967, and South Korea in 1964 were among the countries that successfully car-
ried out a restrictive fiscal policy. In South Korea, deficits in the budget were
entirely eliminated by 1964, and Frank, Kim, and Westphal believe that this
was a necessary condition for slower growth of the money supply.32 Ghana's
experience is representative (except that it started a year prior to devaluation):
Apparently the authorities expected the impact of the devaluation to be in-
flationary.... Thecompensating policies that were introduced centered on the
government deficit. The measure that most usefully sums up the overall situation
is the net increase in the financial claims on the government—i.e., net government
borrowing. ... Fromthe austerity budget of 1966-1967, the deficit was cut fur-
ther in the twelve months following the July 1967 devaluation by about NC 16.5
million (from NC 61.1 million to NC 44.6 million). Without a more complete
macro model, it is difficult to say whether this move was absolutely deflationary
or simply less inflationary. .
.
During both 1961 and 1962 government expenditures rose relative to GNP; the
sum of all current expenditure of the general government plus public fixed capital
formation rose from 10.4 percent of GNP during 1960 to 11.7 percent in 1961 and
to 12.3 percent during 1962. Current revenues ..., whichin 1960 were 95 per.
cent of expenditures, fell to 77 percent of expenditures in 1961 and to 72 percent
in 1962.... Inthe context of weak monetary policy tools. .. suchfiscal policy
was a key factor in the expansion of 42 percent registered in money and quasi
money between the last quarter of 1960 and the last quarter of
The net effect, in the Colombian case, was that the real exchange rate was
scarcely 4 percent above its 1962 level by the second quarter of 1963. The
failure of that devaluation loomed large in the reluctance of Colombian of-
ficials to consider a further devaluation in the next several years.
Indian fiscal policy turned highly restrictionist after the devaluation of
1966. Government expenditures fell from 25.7 percent of national income in
1965/66 to 20.3 percent in 1967/68, and the government deficit was reduced
even in nominal terms. Since the price level was rising over the period, the
decline in the real size of the deficit was substantial. Moreover, inspection of
Table 7-1 indicates that Indian monetary policy was hardly overly expan-
sionary; the rate of growth of the money supply was at an average annual rate
of 9 percent for the two years following devaluation. Other instances of highly
restrictive fiscal policies surrounding Phase III episodes include Israel in 1952,
South Korea in 1964, and the Philippines in 1970. Brazilian restrictive policies
occurred after 1964—a sort of delayed-reaction shift in policy.
There were also a number of failures to implement effective fiscal
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Chile's efforts to make the government sector less expansionary met with
initial success but were not sustained, as Behrman explained:
In all three stabilization programs the government announced its intention to
reduce the size of the government deficit....Inthe first year of the Ibanez-
Klein-Saks program a cut of 15 percent in real terms was achieved. In the next two
years and continuing through the Alessandri program, however, the size of the
real government deficit increased steadily, with annual increases of 53, 14, 26, 29,
and1percent. These governments were able neither to reduce expenditures
signficantly nor to reform the tax system to make it more effective.
Except for the first year of the 1956-58 phase and the last two years of
the Frei program [1968/69], thus, fiscal policy was fairly expansionary. ... The
maintenance of expansionary policies in the midst of anti-inflationary programs
was due to difficulties in obtaining and implementing fiscal reforms on the one
hand and to the desire to limit recessions on the other. .. ."
Somecrude indicators of the fiscal policy shifts accompanying the Phase
III episodes are given in Table 7-2. The data are even less instructive than the
monetary data because expenditure and revenue figures are available only on a
fiscal-year basis. Moreover, data stated in terms of percentages of GNP are
only imperfect indicators of the fiscal impact of the government budget
because ON? itself varied. In addition, the same expenditure/deficit pattern
may have different effects depending on the circumstances surrounding it. For
instance, the Israeli deficits were sizable but financed by foreign loans. They
undoubtedly had a smaller inflationary impact than the Turkish deficits after
the 1970 devaluation even though the latter were smaller relative to GNP.
Subject to these reservations, the data in Table 7-2 on government expen-
ditures and deficits relative to GNP provide some indication of the overall
direction of fiscal policy. The general impression is that, in many instances,
countries were unwilling or unable to carry out the restrictionist fiscal policies
implied by their announced programs. The results of monetary and fiscal
policies are examined further in Chapters 8 and 10.
IV. IMPORT LIBERALIZATION
In addition to the changes in monetary and fiscal policy that result from con-
scious policy shifts and from the exchange rate change and related measures,
there is one other important determinant of the level of economic activity in
the period immediately following devaluation: the extent of import liberaliza-
tion and the way in which it is achieved. Liberalization of imports means
greater reliance on prices and less on QRs. This may be accomplished through
any number of combinations of: (1) raising import prices to absorb premiums,
leaving the quantity unchanged; (2) increasing the flow of imports; and134 MACROECONOMIC POLICIES IN PHASEIll
Table 7-2.Government Expenditures and Deficits for Years Surrounding



















































































Egypt 1962 19.1 20.7 23.7 1.7 2.8 6.7
Ghana 1967 15.3 18.2 19.7 4.3 5.0 5.1























































Note: A plus sign denotes a surplus.
Sources:
Egypt—Expenditures and deficits are taken from
provided by Bent Hansen.
the so-called services budget; data were
India—Government expenditures are the sum of public consumption, public investment, .and
net defense expenditures as given in Bhagwati and Srinivasan, Table 1 of Chapter 8; data are
expressed as a fraction of national income.
Israel—Public expenditures on goods and services from Michaely, p. 202.
SouthKorea—General governmentexpenditures and surplus; data are from Bank of Korea,
EconomicStatistics Yearbook
Philippines—Data providedby Robert Baldwin; deficits were divided by gross domestic product
to obtain the percentage.
(3) reducing aggregate demand (presumably through domestic recession), thus
lowering the demand for imports. The particular combination of policies
followed in pursuit of import liberalization can make a significant difference
to the macroeconomic impact of the devaluation package.
A sizable number of devaluation packages were accompanied by debt
reschedulingat
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rescheduling and the extension of fresh credits to permit increased flows of im-
ports in the postdevaluation period. Important questions for later chapters
concern the role of foreign donors in devaluation decisions, the productivity of
increased import flows following devaluation, and the benefits of that choice
compared with raising EERs for imports or other means of liberalizing the im-
port regime. At this juncture the discussion is confined to evaluating the sorts
of initial shifts in the import regime that accompanied devaluations. First, the
extent of foreign borrowing is reviewed, and then the manner in which imports
were liberalized in the various countries is examined.
Foreign DebtandLoans
Accumulated foreign debt, debt-service obligations, and new borrowing have
played a prominent role in many of the devaluation episodes covered by the
country studies. The "typical" transition from Phase II to Phase III seems to
be the following. Pressures mount in Phase II and bring about a progressive
discrepancy between the EER for imports and their social value, with the
country resorting to a variety of means to augment "scarce" foreign exchange
resources. These means include recourse to suppliers' credits, use of commer-
cial credit markets, borrowing from international agencies, and solicitation of
various types of foreign aid and bilateral payments arrangements. Interest
charges and debt-service obligations mount, and export earnings fail to rise
enough even to keep the premiums on import licenses constant. Imports are
cut back, or at least do not increase sufficiently to permit a satisfactory rate of
economic growth. At some point the country is faced with a peak debt-service
obligation, which, if met, would entail further significant cutbacks in imports;
the alternative would be default. The government then appeals to the aid
donors and international organizations for debt rescheduling and additional
credits in the hope of avoiding a cut in imports and consequent reduction in
the growth rate. The lending organizations then impose certain conditions
upon the country in return for debt rescheduling and fresh lines of credit. One
of those conditions is a formal devaluation of the currency.
In one basic sense, debt rescheduling is as important as the receipt of new
credits. Postponement of $1 of debt servicing is as valuable as $1 of new loans
(at the same interest rate and payment terms) because it permits an additional
$1 of imports in the current time period. Indeed, it can even be argued that
debt rescheduling is more valuable, in that the foreign exchange thereby freed
is untied, whereas fresh credits may not be.36 In practice the difference is that,
in general, debt rescheduling may prevent further cuts in the flow of imports,
while fresh credits may be used to increase the flow of imports. If one knew in
fact what would have happened to imports in the absence of debt rescheduling,
then a comparison of that situation with one in which there was rescheduling
would be perfectly valid. Such information is not, however, available, so the136 MACROECONOMICPOLICIES IN PHASEIII
distinction between debt rescheduling and receipt of fresh credits is meaningful
empirically.
Colombia in 1957 and Chile in 1965 illustrate cases where arrears on com-
mercial debt had mounted and imports were already severely restricted; the
alternative to debt rescheduling would have been further draconian cuts in im-
ports. In the Philippines the Marcos government followed a highly expan-
sionary monetary and fiscal policy in the years 1967 to 1969. One consequence
of that policy was a heavy demand for imports by the government and private
sectors of the economy, and those imports were financed by foreign borrow-
ing. By the end of 1969 the Philippines' external debt was put at $1.6 billion,
with $450 million of that due in 1970 (compared with export earnings of $854
million in 1969) and two-thirds of the total debt due within four years. The
maturing of such a large fraction of the debt was what precipitated the Philip-
pines' 1970 devaluation.
The fact that a country is borrowing does not prove its currency is over-
valued. South Korea, for example, has borrowed heavily on the international
capital market since 1966, but during most of that time, according to Frank,
Kim, and Westphal, the won has been valued at something very close to the
optimal exchange rate. However, when short-term borrowing is used to
finance import flows resulting from domestic excess demand arising out of ex-
pansionary policies (or ambitious development programs), the willingness of
foreigners to extend additional credit diminishes as the volume of outstanding
debt increases.
In contrast to the cases where imports have been excessive and have been
financed by foreign credits, there have been instances where a country is under
a severe burden of debt but has already substantially curtailed its imports. In
those situations, import liberalization accompanying devaluation has required
not only debt rescheduling but also additional borrowing. The Turkish
devaluation of 1958 provides an excellent example. Turkey had suffered
drastic reductions in imports (from $468 million in 1953 to $315 million in
1958) and had accumulated large arrears in commercial indebtedness. One
part of the Turkish devaluation package was debt consolidation and reschedul-
ing. In addition, $359 million of fresh credits were extended to enable Turkey
to resume importing spare parts, intermediate goods, and capital goods. The
increased flow of imports was important in eliminating the premiums on im-
port licenses and also in absorbing inflationary pressures within the domestic
economy.
Import Flows
When the import EER increases, the domestic currency cost of a unit of im-
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licenses are transferred in part or entirely to the central bank. That absorption
of purchasing power is deflationary because itis quite possible for the
døriestic value (paid to the central bank) of imports to increase even though
the foreign currency value declines;is also possible for the trade balance to
show a negative shift in terms of domestic currencies but a positive shift in
terms of foreign currency.37
Consider the case in which devaluation is just sufficient to absorb the
premium earlier received by import license recipients. Assume that the
premium was uniform across commodities and, further, that the increase in
the export EER is proportionately the same as that for imports.38 Insofar as
imports exceeded exports prior to devaluation—and continue to do so—there
is a net increase in the absorption of purchasing power by the central bank.
In addition to the effect of premium absorption on purchasing power, the
behavior of the flow of imports itself has important macroeconomic implica-
tions. In countries where fresh credits permit import flows to increase follow-
ing devaluation, that increase will be deflationary. Import liberalization,
therefore, whether it results from absorption of the premium (and thus a
transfer of purchasing power from the private sector to the central bank) or
from an increased flow of imports, will be deflationary. When devaluation is
accompanied by sharp cutbacks in imports, inflationary pressures result.
It is therefore necessary to examine the flow of imports in terms of both
foreign and domestic currencies. The data in Table 7-3 provide a rough idea of
the change in import flows in each oL the twenty-two Phase III episodes. The
first three columns give the dollar value of imports in the three years surroun-
ding the devaluation. The next three columns give the change in the local cur-
rency value of imports. The seventh column gives the GNP in the year of
devaluation. The final two columns then give the percent that the increment in
the domestic value of imports represents of GNP—the second-to-last column
expresses the net change in the domestic value of imports for the year follow-
ing devaluation from the year preceding it as a percentage of GNP; the final
column provides the same measure for the change in imports from the year of
devaluation to the year afterward.
As with other measures, there are problems with these. The exact timing
of the devaluation significantly affects the value of annual data for
two countries pursuing the identical proportionate liberalization of imports
would look quite different if one had devalued in February and the other in
November. However, the problems of seasonality in imports and errors in
recording the data make the use of monthly or quarterly data even more pro-
blematic (and GNP figures are in any event unavailable). A second difficulty
with the data is that the domestic currency value of imports is given in c.i.f.
terms. What is really relevant is the amount paid to the government and cen-
tral bank for imports before and after the devaluation; to the extent that net































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































zcy value of imports c.i.f. overstates the change in domestic expenditures on im-
ports. Finally, for the rapid-inflation countries, the domestic currency values
of imports are difficult to interpret as proportions of GNP, since the year-to-
year increase in nominal GNP isitself so large. The data in Table 7-3
nonetheless provide some evidence as to the behavior of import flows and their
relative magnitudes following devaluations. Turning first to the volume of im-
ports, as reflected by dollar values, it is apparent that the macroeconomic im-
pact must have varied widely. On one hand, there is a group of countries that
either did not attempt to reduce import flows or deliberately increased them.
Many of those increases—most notably those in Chile in 1965, Colombia in
1967, the Philippines in 1960, and Turkey in 1958 and in 1970—resulted in a
substantial liberalization of the import regimes. On the other hand, there were
also devaluations that were accompanied by sharp cutbacks in the level of im-
ports. In some cases, such as India in 1966 and Brazil following 1964, the
domestic demand for imports fell as a result of recession, and imports were
consequently liberalized despite the decline in volume. In other cases, such as
Israel's 1952 devaluation and South Korea's 1964 Phase III, the increase in im-
port EERs was sufficient to absorb a great deal of the premium on imports
despite the cutback, so that liberalization nonetheless occurred. In yet other
cases, most notably Colombia's 1957 devaluation, a major purpose was to cut
back the level of imports, and liberalization was limited.
The next three columns of Table 7-3 provide examples in which the
domestic currency value of imports increased while the dollar value fell. An ex-
treme case is the Colombian 1957 devaluation, when a drop in imports from
$657 million to $483 million was accompanied by an increase in their domestic
value from 1,643 million pesos to 2,105 million pesos. The order of magnitude
of the change in domestic value of imports is indicated by the last two columns
of Table 7-3. As already noted, the EER should be used, but is unavailable,
and there are the familiar difficulties with timing. Nonetheless, some of the
magnitudes are impressive. The increment in the domestic currency value of
imports, as a percent of GNP, can be quite large; for example, in the Philip-
pines in 1970 the dollar value of imports fell slightly between 1969 and 1970,
while the peso value rose from 4,933 to 7,299 million pesos. This increment
represented 5.7 percent of GNP.
The data in Table 7-3 suggest that the increased local currency cost of im-
ports can be highly significant. However, they obscure some important
changes. The 1958 Turkish devaluation, for example, occurred in August; im-
ports in the first half of the year were extremely low, so quarterly measurement
would show a much larger increase in import values for the last half of the year
than the 3.1 percent indicated in the table. It will be seen in Chapter 8 that
changes in import flows were one important factor in determining the price
level impact of devaluation and also the level of economic activity in the
postdevaluation period.
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1. Of course, insofar as devaluation alters the structure of variance of EERs across different
commodity groups, there might still be some real effects. If the average export EER returns to its
predevaluation real level, it is improbable that export earnings will significantly increase. That, in
turn, implies that liberalization cannot be sustained, which means that premiums on import
licenses and the resulting bias of the regime will likely revert to the former level.
2. In some instances, stabilization programs were undertaken at the insistence of interna-
tional donors and creditors as a necessary condition for debt rescheduling, new credits, or other
considerations. In such instances the relative importance attached to reducing the domestic rate of
inflation compared to altering the trade and payments regime can differ significantly between the
officials of the country and the donor/creditor countries. See Chapter 10 for a discussion of the
role of creditors.
3. It is arguable whether the Egyptian devaluation of 1962 ought to be regarded as a
stabilization program. The IMF was heavily involved as the Egyptian government badly needed
foreign credit. The IMF appears to have laid down conditions, including restraint on monetary
and fiscal policy, underwhich it would extend credit. However, as Hansen and Nashashibi ex-
plain,"There is little doubt that the government, despite its commitments to the IMF, had no in-
tention whatever of cutting down domestic demand; at any rate, domestic demand continued to
expand vigorously ..." (Hansenand Nashashibi, p. 90).
4. It should be noted that the converse is not necessaily true. In principle one might succeed
in stabilizing the domestic price level and yet for one reason or another fail to be able to maintain
liberalization. An adverse shift in the world prices of major exports, failure to devalue sufficiently,
or bad weather and resulting crop failures might lead to such a result. Among the countries
covered in the project, the Indian devaluation came closest to this outcome: the rate of inflation
fell sharply, but bad weather led to poor crops in the postdevaluation period. There is also con-
siderable ground for believing that the devaluation was insufficient to permit sustained liberaliza-
tion.
5. Behrman, p. 300.
6. Bhagwati and Srinivasan, p. 83
7. Leith, pp. 109-10.
8. Krueger, pp. 68-71.
9. Baldwin, pp. 75-76.
10. Krueger, pp. 78-79.
11. Leith, p. 110.
12. Behrman, p. 298.
13. See ibid., p. 296.
17. Michaely, p. 144.
18. Behrman, pp. 227-28.
19. However, this factor is only operative as long as the balance of payments is in surplus. If
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15. Fishlow, pp. 30-32.
16. See, for example, Michael G. Porter, "Capital Flows as an Offset to Monetary Policy:
The German Experience," IMF Staff Papers 19 (July 1972): 395-422; and Pentti J.K. Kouri and
Michael 0. Porter, "International Capital Flows and Portfolio Equilibrium," Journal of Political
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tions in the surplus, the mechanism would tend to stop when the surplus was eliminated.
20. Control of inflation is also likely to be more difficult the more important are short-term
capital flows for thecountry in question. In the early 1970s South Korea was experiencing con-
siderable difficulty in controlling her money supply because of the importance of the international
financial market in influencing capital flows.
21. Perhaps the most massive policy shift was Israel's 1952 New Economic Policy, discussed PARTIII above.
22.Diaz, p. 19.
23. Ibid., p. 20. Outcome
24.See Table 7-1.
25. The Brazilians also had major monetary reforms. They raised their nominal interest rates
enough to make the real rate of interest positive and began indexing a variety of transactions in die
1964-1968 Phase III.
26. Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 19.
27. Even a uniform method of seasonal adjustment of the basic data would not be adequate,
although such numbers are not in any event available. For example, the money supply in Ghana is
heavily influenced by the timing of cocoa purchases and exports. In most years the seasonal peak
comes in the fourth quarter, but sometimes it is delayed until the first quarter of the following
year.
28. For that matter, so did the increased flow of imports, which is discussed below. See
Krueger, p. 91, for details about government revenues.
29. Behrman, p. 228.
30. Frank, Kim, and Westphal, Chapter 9.
31. In the 1970 Turkish devaluation, export subsidies were not removed for minor exports.
They were expressed in percentage terms and rose dramatically with devaluation. The result was a
surge of "minor" exports with, of course, an accompanying increase in government expenditures.
Traditional exports, however, did not get the full benefit of the new exchange rate, receiving only
IL 12 per U.S. dollar. The revenue increase was greater than the increased payments.
32. Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 18.
33. Leith, p. 124.
34. pp. 191-93.
35. Behrman, pp. 303-304.
36. Donor countries and international ogranizations have typically computed the amount of
gross aid received at the time of devaluation to include the value of debt rescheduling. In general,
borrowing countries have calculated the value of net aid received.
37. This phenomenon is analyzed carefully by Richard N. Cooper, "Devaluation and Ag-
gregate Demand in Aid-Receiving Countries," in J. Bhagwati, R. Jones, R. Mundell, and J.
Vanek, eds., Trade,Balance of Payments and Growth (Amsterdam:North Holland, 1971).
38. The magnitude of the bias of the regime is irrelevant for present purposes.